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The question of the determinants of the fertility transitions of countries from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been widely debated in the field of demography. Some scholars have investigated individual-level variables like contraceptive use, delayed age at marriage and participation of women in the labour force. Other scholars have used cultural factors to understand fertility change and patterns in SSA.
This study intended to design a community-based model for agricultural development in Uganda, using Kumi and Gomba districts as case studies. The surge in attention towards community-based development is attributed to the growing challenges posed by the traditional approaches to community development, dominated by top-down mechanisms during the planning, implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation phases of community development programmes.
Teenagers’ networked participatory culture is influenced by the way they interact, self-present themselves, establish and maintain friendships, and the way they coordinate their day to day lives. Livingstone and Third (2017) have argued that these have contributed to teenagers’ pervasive access and use of social media and mobile phones.
The thesis addresses the question: how have international human rights norms for protecting women and girls from harmful practices influenced and shaped the emergence and conceptualisation of community bylaws for addressing child marriage and other harmful practices affecting women in rural Malawi?
That consciousness is ubiquitous, and relevant to autopoietic self-organisation and embodiment within every living being and/or organism, is a prevalent idea in contemporary consciousness research. However, because „consciousness‟ as a word is derived from con or cum, meaning „with‟ or „together‟ and scire, „to know‟ or „to see‟ it infers the experience of knowing with an „other‟ and/or „others‟.
‘The mind-body problem’ is the problem of how to understand conscious awareness within a world made up of physical things. But I argue that any view according to which it is meaningful to use different terms to refer to ‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ must be a dualist view; and that dualism is not a satisfactory metaphysical position. A strong case can be made for the claim that even those who profess to be opposed to dualism can often still be described as ‘closet’ dualists.
‘The mind-body problem’ is the problem of how to understand conscious awareness within a world made up of physical things. But I argue that any view according to which it is meaningful to use different terms to refer to ‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ must be a dualist view; and that dualism is not a satisfactory metaphysical position. A strong case can be made for the claim that even those who profess to be opposed to dualism can often still be described as ‘closet’ dualists. Much typical ‘consciousness’ research concerns what David Chalmers calls ‘the easy problems of consciousness’. My own view is that almost all of Chalmers’ ‘easy problems’ could better be characterized as ‘problems to do with (‘conscious’) sense perception, and with cognition’. However, perception and cognition are very often not ‘conscious;’ therefore, I argue, approaching conscious experience by means of investigating perception or cognition is problematic. Just like perceptual and cognitive processes, psychological processes can take place without being (introspectively) ‘conscious’. I explain how Freud’s account of unconscious psychological processes enables him to understand psychical processes as similar in kind to other natural (physical) processes; and I dismiss a number of complaints from critics who have misunderstood Freud’s naturalist project. On the Freudian view, which I endorse, it is problematic to equate ‘what is mental’ with ‘what is conscious’. The considerations against conflating ‘the mind’ with ‘consciousness,’ I argue, are just as relevant within philosophy as they are in the context of psychoanalysis. The condition hydranencephaly (in which children are born with part of their brain missing) provides good evidence that we should not approach the mind-body by examining the functioning of the cerebral cortex – which goes against the prevalent ‘corticocentric’ view of ‘consciousness’. Whereas Mark Solms claims that hydranencephaly is problematic to the Freudian view, I argue that Freud’s view is well-suited to accommodating cases of hydranencephaly. Finally, I argue that, rather than talking about ‘the mind-body problem,’ we should use a biological naturalist framework to help us understand why there is no such problem. If we are able to free ourselves from our dualist intuitions, something along the lines of Panksepp’s ‘affect-centric’ view – which incorporates several commitments that are central to Freudian theory – is just what we need to help us understand the truly physical nature of conscious awareness.
The study examines how the family, peers, and sociocultural environment at school in primary schools in South Africa perpetuated divergent gendered experiences among immigrant learners. A qualitative narrative inquiry was used during the study.
The thesis, A Critical Analysis of the Oversight Role and Function of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in Promoting Accountability in South Africa’s Public Sector, looks at the underlying problem of financial mismanagement in the public sector in relation to public accountability in South Africa. This problem has manifested in growing wasteful, irregular and fruitless expenditure in a post-apartheid era confronted by a multitude of social-economic challenges.
This study was motivated by the fact that young adults living with Williams syndrome in South Africa do not have access to post-secondary institutions capable of addressing their distinctive educational needs. I was further driven to conduct this study due to the lack of support in the South African post-secondary educational system for young adults with Williams syndrome.